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Abstract
It is widely accepted that OAuth is the most popular authorization scheme adopted and
implemented by industrial and academic world, however, it is difficult to adapt OAuth
to the situation in which online applications registered with one cloud party intends to
access data residing in another cloud party. In this thesis, by leveraging Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute Based Encryption technique and Elgamal-like mask over the protocol, we propose
a reading authorization scheme among diverse clouds, which is called fuzzy authorization, to
facilitate an application registered with one cloud party to access to data residing in another
cloud party. More importantly, we enable the fuzziness of authorization thus to enhance
the scalability and flexibility of file sharing by taking advantage of the innate connections
of Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme and Generalized Reed Solomon code. Furthermore, by
conducting error checking and error correction, we eliminate operation of satisfying a access
tree. In addition, the automatic revocation is realized with update of TimeSlot attribute
when data owner modifies the data. We prove the security of our schemes under the
selective-attribute security model. The protocol flow of fuzzy authorization is implemented
with OMNET++ 4.2.2 and the bi-linear pairing is realized with PBC library. Simulation
results show that our scheme can achieve fuzzy authorization among heterogeneous clouds
with security and efficiency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cloud storage is a model of networked enterprise storage where data is stored in virtualized
pools of storage which are generally hosted by third parties. The third parties, or cloud
service providers (CSPs) operate large data centres. Clients of cloud service providers who
require their data to be hosted buy or lease storage capacity from CSPs. Those clients are
called data owners, or owners for short. The data center operators, in the background,
virtualize the resources according to the requirements of the customer and expose them
as storage pools, which the customers can themselves use to store files or data objects.
Data hosted in the cloud is referred as outsourced data. Physically, the resource may span
across multiple servers. The safety of the files depends upon the hosting websites.
Advantages of cloud storage such as ease of accessibility, in-time syncing and less phys-
ical space consuming, etc., have motivated more and more people to adopt cloud storage
service provided by companies like JustCloud, Google Drive and so on. In the meantime,
cloud computing services are boosting as well. There were 360 million-plus users and
32 thousand-plus applications merely in Google Chrome Web Store by the middle April
2013 [1]. As a result, the demand of inter-operations and authorizations between cloud
storage service providers and cloud application service providers becomes more and more
urgent. For example, a data owner stores several PDF files inside Justcloud, which is the
top one cloud storage service provider [2]. Later on, data owner wants to merge some
of the PDF files into one with the help of pdfmerge, an online cloud application service
1
provider registered with Google Chrome Web Store [3]. The application pdfmerge needs
to be authorized to access the pdf files residing in Justcloud, i.e., cloud storage provider;
otherwise owner has to download the files from Justcloud and upload them to pdfmerge.
Since the direct authorization solution outweighs the downloading and uploading opera-
tions in perspective of flexibility, scalability, efficiency and convenience, a proper and secure
authorization protocol is needed.
One of the main obstacles is that it is tough to build trust between owner and cloud
application, e.g., pdfmerge, because they are residing in diverse cloud parties. Another
unwieldy issue is that multiple access tokens and secret keys are needed rather than one if
owner wants to authorize access right of several files. Therefore, a scheme that builds the
trust between owner and applications and reduces the number of access tokens and secret
keys is required.
It is widely accepted that OAuth [4] is the most widely-adopted authorization scheme,
unfortunately, it is infeasible to address the situation mentioned above. This is because
Oauth protocol requires both resource data and accessing application to be in the same
domain. For example, http://pixlr.com, a web-application targeting on editing pictures
online, registered with Google Chrome Web Store which can easily access to data residing
in Google Drive, but can hardly edit pictures from JustCloud. By introducing a trusted
organization Authority which maintains the integrity of cloud application service provider,
AAuth proposed by Tassanaviboon et al. addressed a similar situation in which owner and
consumer are not the same domain [5]. Unfortunately, the feeble scalability of authorization
in AAuth does not fix multiple authorizations required by the situation mentioned above.
In order to address the aforementioned issues, we propose fuzzy authorization (FA) for
cloud storage which is an secure file-sharing scheme with high scalability and flexibility
by leveraging and modifying Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [6]
and Oauth. Moreover, FA is suitable for owner to share encrypted data with others and
keep the content of data from being known by the cloud storage provider.
The term fuzzy indicates that our authorization scheme has attribute-discrepancy toler-
ance. Depending on where the checking nodes are added, different attribute sets will possess
error-tolerance ability and hence different functionality can be achieved. For example, if
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the checking nodes are inserted into the sub-tree of file attributes, the file-attribute set will
gain error-tolerance property. Therefore one secret key issued to an application could be
used to access multiple files which share a large enough overlap on the file-attribute set.
While if we add the checking nodes into the sub-tree of application attributes, the archive
without changing or updating the access policy could be accessed by multiple applications
as well as enough numbers of attributes are shared among the applications.
Authorization schemes supporting fuzziness can also be derived from Fuzzy IBE. How-
ever, the leakage of file attributes to ASPs is needed. Knowing the file attributes, one can
easily deduce a certain amount of private information of owner and hence jeopardize the
privacy of owner. For example, last modified time of file alludes owner’s activity time.
Comparing to the authorization schemes derived from Fuzzy IBE, our scheme avoids file
attributes’ leakage and protects owner’s privacy thoroughly.
The key features of FA include:
• Fuzzy authorization enables data owner to share their data with applications from a
different cloud party.
• By exploiting the transformation from Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme (LSSS) to Gen-
eral Reed Solomon (GRS) code and inserting checking nodes into the access tree,
FA enhances the scalability and flexibility of file-sharing. Moreover, through error
detection and error correction, FA avoids owner sending file attributes to application
service providers and eliminates the procedure of satisfying access tree [7].
• FA scheme revokes applications’ right of accessing to a file automatically when the
file is modified and re-encrypted by updating the secret share of TimeSlot attribute.
To summarize, the contributions of our work are as follows:
1. We proposes a new secure authorization scheme for cloud storage providing error
tolerance, called fuzzy authorization (FA).
2. The security analysis shows that our FA scheme provides a thorough security of
outsourced data, including confidentiality, integrity and secure access control.
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3. The simulation results demonstrates that FA reduces the storage consumption com-
pare to other similar possible authorization schemes. Simulation of FA protocol also
suggests that our scheme could achieve the error tolerance and realize fuzzy autho-
rization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: The literature survey is discussed in the Chap-
ter 2 and preliminaries are introduced in Chapter 3. While in Chapter 4, we present the
constructions of our scheme and the protocol procedures. Then detailed security reduction
and analysis are then given in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we demonstrate implementa-
tion environment, optimizations and experience results. Finally, in Chapter 7, we make a
conclusion and give out the future work.
4
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
Cloud storage has grown to become popular and is adopted by many individuals and
organizations. The widely adoption of cloud storage raised several security concerns about
the outsourced data, such as confidentiality, integrity and access control of the data. Both
academic and industrial world are making efforts to maintain the security of the outsourced
data.
2.1 Encryption Solutions for Cloud Storage
Cloud storage providers are neither considered as fully trustworthy nor are resistant to
attacks because they have access to the storage infrastructure. So the encryption of owner’s
data seems to be necessary. A plenty of encryption solutions are devised and introduced into
cloud computing environment. For the confidentiality of the outsourced data, Agudo et al.
suggested several encryption schemes that can be adopted in cloud storage environment [8].
Xu et al. [9] adopt the traditional AES encryption for their scheme and introduce the access
policy on the top of this encryption.
On the premise that individuals previously possessed the plain data M and stored the
secret key k derived from M in their local storage, Davida et al. introduce their encryption
solution for cloud-based storage [10]. Since the secret key is derived as the hash value of M ,
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the requirement of pre-sharing key among individuals is avoided. Moreover, by leveraging
Error Correction Code (ECC) encoding and decoding, they suggest a scheme to achieve
compressed encryption for slightly different messages. In their compressed encryption
construction, messages M1 and M2 are similar. Message M1 is first decoded as canonical
M ′, and the difference vector δ1 = M1
⊕
M ′ is computed. For the similar message M2,
δ2 = M2
⊕
M ′ is calculated as well. In order to reduce the storage consumption, the cipher-
text M ′ and the compressed δ1 and δ2 are stored into the cloud rather than cipher-texts of
both M1 and M2.
Vimercati et al. propose an encryption scheme relying on the translation from the
access control policy to an equivalent encryption policy which will reduce the number of
keys and amount of encryption [11]. In order to enable a cloud storage user to authorize
the limited access right to a desired group of other users, an external honest-but-curious
service is introduced to manage the authorization policies. But the external service is
unable to approach the plain data and prevent authorized user to access data. The plain
data is encrypted with a symmetric key. By exploiting a Diffie-Hellman key agreement
method, the symmetric key is derived from a secret held by each group user. So only the
users who hold the appointed secrets can obtain the key and perform decryption.
2.2 Integrity Schemes for Cloud Storage
Besides confidentiality, integrity is another significant security concern for cloud storage.
As the outsourced data is in control of a cloud storage provider rather than owner, the
data can be easily tampered due to intentional or unintentional reasons.
Several researchers suggests to adopt a third party auditor (TPA) to maintain the
integrity of owner’s data stored in cloud [12] [13]. Zhu et al. introduce a dynamic au-
dit services for integrity verification [13], in which TPA regularly audit the integrity and
availability of the outsourced data with index-hash table (IHT) and public verification pa-
rameters (PVP) that are previously stored in TPA . In addition, authorized entities with
secret key sk have the ability to dynamically update IHT and PVP stored in TPA. Wang
et al. suggest a TPA leveraging the homomorphic linear authenticator [14] to reduce the
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communication and computation overhead compared to the straightforward data auditing
approaches.
Rather than relying on a TPA, Bowers, Juels et al. devise High-Availability and In-
tegrity Layer (HAIL) [15] for cloud storage to enhance the availability and integrity of data
residing in cloud. In this paper, they combine the proof of retrievability (POR) [16] and
proof of data possession (PDP) [17]. No third party auditor is needed because a single
trusted verifier is attached with outsourced data and will be verified by a client or a service
acting on behalf of a client.
2.3 Access Control for Cloud Storage
Works have been done as to migrate and adapt the mature traditional authorization man-
agement to cloud computing [18]. Besides that, a series of new access control schemes and
solutions have been researched and devised for cloud environment based on the general
access control solutions.
Of all the access control architectures, Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) schemes are
the most popular ones due to its scalability and security. Unlike Access Control List (ACL)
only defines which entities have the access right, ABE schemes encrypt the data under the
access policy which only ensure the eligible entities to do decryption. A distinguished
work Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [19] was introduced by Sahai and Waters in
2005. In Fuzzy IBE scheme, a private key for an identity set ω, can be used to decrypt
a cipher-text encrypted with an slightly different identity set ω′. Fuzzy IBE realizes error
tolerance by setting the threshold value of root node smaller than the size of identity set.
Later based on Fuzzy IBE, Goyal et al. present Keypolicy-Attribute Based Encryption
(KP-ABE) [20] in which cipher-texts are labelled with sets of attributes and private keys
are associated with access structures that control which cipher-texts a user can decrypt.
Bethencourt et al. then introduce a complementary scheme to KP-ABE, called Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based-Encryption (CP-ABE) [6] in which attributes are used to describe
the user’s credentials and the formulas over these credentials are attached to the cipher-text
by the encrypting party. Waters supplies more concrete and general CP-ABE construc-
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tions in later papers [21] [22]. Boneh constructed BB1 and BB2 approaches [7] to build
Identity-Based Encryption. The hierarchical construction within BB1 and BB2 can be ef-
ficiently secured against chosen-ciphertext attack. More importantly, Boneh extended the
underlying Diffie-Hellman assumption to asymmetric pairing which is more advantageous
and practical. Both CP-ABE and KP-ABE can be easily adapted to cloud environment
and hence a lot of research work are founded on them [5] [23] [24] [25].
Key to Cloud (K2C), is realized by Zarandioon et al. through Attribute Based-
Hierarchical Key Updating (AB-HKU) [23]. Built on top of KP-ABE with an access
tree, AB-HKU scheme supports efficient delegation and revocation of privileges for hier-
archies as well as eliminates the requirements of complex cryptographic data structures.
AB-HKU is especially convenient and efficient in revocation through one increment of the
root threshold value.
Tassanaviboon et al. proposes an OAuth and ABE based authorization in semi-trusted
cloud computing called AAuth [5]. Their authorization method enables an owner-to-
consumer encryption and supports encrypted file sharing without revealing owner’s se-
cret key to consumers by introducing a third party authority. In AAuth, owner’s data is
first encrypted by a symmetric key; then the symmetric key is encrypted under modified
CP-ABE. To ensure the integrity of the outsourced data, integrity tag is computed and
attached with the cipher-texts. Only authorized consumer is granted with secret key to
decrypt for the symmetric key.
A cryptographic-based access control [24] for owner-write-user-read applications is in-
troduced by Wang et al. in 2009. Their access control system encrypts every data block of
cloud storage and adopts a key derivation method to reduce the number of keys. Yu ad-
dressed fine-grained data access control, efficient key/user management, user accountability
and etc., for cloud storage in his dissertation [25].
A solution to address the proof of ownership and eliminate the unnecessary client-
side duplication of users sensitive data files is devised by Xu et al. [9]. To protect data
privacy from both outside adversaries and the honest-but-curious cloud storage server, they
encrypts the sensitive data with AES method and introduces their own hash function and
constructs Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) to provide hash-as-a-proof functionality. During the
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process of proof-of-ownership, a cross-user provides the digest hash value and the random
leaf node value of MHT required by the cloud server can be proved as owner and access to
the data.
Due to the reason of economy and simplicity, most cloud environment tends to utilize
the mature method or standardized method to handle the security concerns in the cloud
storage. Google Drive, for example, authorize the access right based on OAuth standard [4].
From industrial aspect, Cloud Data Management Interface (CDMI) [26], was stan-
dardized by Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA) specifying a protocol for
self-provisioning, administering and accessing cloud storage. In CDMI, access control
comprises the mechanisms by which various types of access to data are authorized and
permitted or denied. CDMI uses the well-known mechanism of an ACL as defined in the
NFSv4 standard [27].
2.4 Other Security Concerns for Cloud Storage
Besides the security of outsourced data, there are several other issues that might be con-
sidered.
Targeted on protecting users’ consumption pattern of cloud computing resources, such
as CPU time, storage space etc., anonymous yet authorized and bounded cloud resource
schemes [28] are introduced by Slamanig. In the anonymous yet authorized and bounded
cloud resource schemes, a partially blindly signed token comprising the setting where users
should be able to register and obtain a resource bound from a cloud provider is granted
to user. Convinced that the anonymous user’s request for resource, computing or storage
resource, does not exceed the limit, cloud provider grants the request. Therefore, there is
no way for cloud provider to figure out the consumption pattern of a particular user due
to the anonymity and unlink-ability.
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we primarily introduce Shamir’s (K, N) threshold scheme in Section 3.1.
Then some background about GRS encoding, error checking and decoding are reviewed in
Section 3.2. Then in Section 3.3, the fundamental information of CP-ABE is given. At
last the asymmetric bilinear pairing is given in Section 3.4 and the security assumption is
demonstrated in Section 3.5.
3.1 Shamir’s (K,N) Threshold Scheme
Secret sharing acts as an critical part in CP-ABE and hence Waters gives out the denifi-
nition of a general Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme (LSSS) [21]. Shamir’s (K, N) threshold
scheme is a typical LSSS which plays an essential role in constructing the access policy
tree and the recovery of the top secret s.
3.1.1 Distribute the Shares of Top Secret
In order to share a top secret s ∈ Zq, we divide it into N pieces si ∈ Zq, i ∈ U where U
is an index set {1, 2, ..., N}. Given p(x) = s + p1x + p2x2 + ... + pK−1xK−1, where pi are
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randomly selected from Zq. The secret shares are evaluated as
si = p(xi) (3.1)
where xi ∈ Zq are distinct non-zero numbers.
3.1.2 Reconstruct the Top Secret
Given an index set U ′ = {i1, i2, ..., iK} and K distinct points in the 2-dimensional plane
(xi1 , yi1), (xi2 , yi2), ..., (xiK , yiK ), by interpolation, an unique polynomial
p(x) = p0 + p1x+ p2x
2+, ...,+pK−1xK−1,
where pk(x) =
∏
j∈U ′,j 6=ik
x− xj
xik − xj
;
(3.2)
or equivalently, p(x) =
K∑
k=1
∏
j∈U ′,j 6=ik
x− xj
xik − xj
yik (3.3)
can be reconstructed. Hence given any different K out N points, the top secret s can be
recovered as
s = p(0) =
K∑
k=1
∏
j∈U ′,j 6=ik
0− xj
xik − xj
yik . (3.4)
3.2 Generalized Reed Solomon (GRS) Code Encoding
and Decoding
3.2.1 GRS Code Encoding
Let F be a finite field with q elements, vector of code locators γ = (γ1, γ2, ..., γN) ∈ FN,
where γi are distinct and vector of column multipliers v = (v1, v2, ..., vN) ∈ FN where
vi 6= 0. Let p = (p0, p1, ..., pK−1), pi ∈ F be a message vector to be encoded and the
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message polynomial is p(x) =
∑K−1
i=0 pix
i. Then the corresponding codeword vector is
presented as
c = (c1, c2, ..., cN)
= (v1p(γ1), v2p(γ2), ..., vNp(γN)).
(3.5)
3.2.2 GRS Code Error Checking
GRS code is a linear [N,K, d] code, where d = N −K + 1, with error correction ability e
= bN−K
2
c. The parity check matrix is defined as
H ,

1 1 ··· 1
γ1 γ2 ··· γN
γ21 γ
2
2 ··· γ2N
...
...
...
...
γN−K−11 γ
N−K−1
2 ··· γN−K−1N

 v1 0 0 ··· 00 v2 0 ··· 00 0 v3 ··· 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 ··· vN
 . (3.6)
Suppose vector r = (r1, r2, ..., rN) is received. We denote the error vector as e = (e1, e2, ..., eN).
Decoder computes the syndrome vector as
s = (s1, s2, ..., sN−K)
= Hr>
= H(c> + e>)
= He>.
(3.7)
This yields
sl+1 =
N∑
j=1
ejvjγ
l
j, l = 0, 1, ..., N −K − 1. (3.8)
An all-zero vector s indicates that there is no error. Otherwise, error(s) exists and
further error correction process must be performed.
3.2.3 GRS Code Decoding
In this subsection, we briefly review the three decoding algorithms of GRS code. Recall
that r = (r1, r2, ..., rN) is the received vector, c = (c1, c2, ..., cN) is the codeword, γ =
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(γ1, γ2, ..., γN) is the code locator vector and v = (v1, v2, ..., vN) is the column multiplier
vector.
Interpolation-based decoding and syndrome-based decoding are two well-known de-
coding types of GRS codes. Berlekamp-Welch algorithm [29], a typical interpolation-
based decoding algorithm, and Peterson-Gorenstein-Zierler(PGZ) algorithm [30], a classi-
cal syndrome-based decoding procedure are reviewed here. Both algorithms are well known
for their efficiency. Intuitively, one of these algorithms should be adopted to perform decod-
ing. Unfortunately, none of them, nor the other advanced decoding algorithm is applicable
in our system. A detailed representation of how these algorithms fail to decoding in our
system is shown in the next chapter Section 4.5.5. Fortunately, Reed-Solomon’s original
decoding method can be adapted in our situation.
Berlekamp-Welch Algorithm
Let two vectors x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and y = {y1, y2, . . . , yn}, xi, yi ∈ F, the distance of
x and y is defined as d(x, y) = {i|xi 6= yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. We define E(x) an error locator
polynomial over F such that
E(γi) = 0 where ri 6= ci and deg(E(x)) = e. (3.9)
That is
E(x) =
∏
γi∈J
(x− γi), where J = {γi|ri 6= ci} (3.10)
and
|J | = e ≤ N −K
2
. (3.11)
From equation (3.9), it is easy to check equation
riE(γi) = viP (γi)E(γi), i = 1, 2, ...N (3.12)
will always hold. We now define a polynomial Q(x) over F as
Q(x) = P (x)E(x). (3.13)
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From equations (3.11) and (3.12), it follows
deg(Q(x)) ≤ N −K
2
+K − 1 (3.14)
and
Q(γi) =
E(γi)ri
vi
, i = 1, 2, ...N. (3.15)
Berlekamp-Welch decoder takes the codeword length N , the number of errors e, and the
received word r as input, and outputs either P (x) or failure. The decoder contains two
main steps.
1. By interpolation, decoder computes a non zero polynomial E(x) of degree e such
that (3.11), (3.14) and (3.15) hold. Failure will be outputted if there is no such
polynomials E(x) or Q(x) satisfying those conditions.
2. Let P ′(x) = Q(x)
E(x)
, and c′ = (c′1, c
′
2, ..., c
′
N) where c
′
i = viP
′(γi). Let d(c′, r) denote
the distance between codeword derived from P ′(x) and the received codeword. If
d(c′, r) ≤ e, sets P (x) = P ′(x).
Peterson-Gorenstein-Zierler (PGZ) algorithm
In PGZ algorithm, syndrome polynomial S(x) = 1 +
N−K−1∑
i=1
sixi is defined based on vector
s. Error locator polynomial is represented as Λ(x) = 1 +
e∑
i=1
Λix
i. Expanding the equa-
tion (3.12), a certain connection between coefficients of Λ(x) and S(x) can be deducted
and expressed as [ s1 s2 ··· se
s2 s3 ··· se+1
...
...
...
...
se se+1 ···s2e−1
] ΛeΛe−1...
Λ1
 = [ −se+1−se+2...−s2e
]
. (3.16)
Denote the left-most matrix as Se×e and the invert of this matrix as S>e×e. Solving the
above equation will give us the coefficients of error locator polynomial. With further
factorization of Λ(x), set J , i.e., the locations of where went wrong will be identified.
From equation (3.10), error polynomial E(x) can be obtained.
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Original Decoding Algorithm
Given received vector r = (r1, r2, ..., rN) and index set U = {1, 2, ..., N}, decoder selects
K out of N indices in all possible ways to form subset U ′′ = {i1, i2, ..., iK} of U . Decoder
then interpolates a potential message polynomial p′(x) of degree K − 1 as
p′(x) = p′0 + p
′
1x+ p
′
2x
2+, ...,+p′K−1x
K−1 =
K∑
t=1
∏
j∈U ′′,j 6=it
x− γj
γit − γj
rit . (3.17)
Consequently, the potential message is given as the vector of coefficients of p′(x), i.e.,
p′ = (p′0, p
′
1, ..., p
′
K−1). Since all possible selections are made, the most often occurring
potential message polynomial gives a codeword closest to the received word [31]. However,
we need to re-encode the message by evaluating p′(x) at γi to get codeword c′. Denote
d(c′, r) as the distance of c′ and r, if d(c′, r) ≤ e, c = c′ is the canonical codeword and
s = p′(0) is the top secret. If not, decoding fails.
Despite the fact that Reed-Solomon’s original decoding method’s inefficiency, in terms
of small size messages and codewords, it is still useful and practical. Moreover, unlike the
other advanced and efficient decoding algorithms, the original decoding method helps us
circumvent the discrete logarithm problem in CP-ABE scheme. A detailed description of
why advanced algorithm like Berlekamp-Welch algorithm and PGZ algorithm cannot be
used is given in the next chapter. The original GRS decoding procedure brought up by I.
S. Reed and G. Solomon [31] serves our purpose and hence is adopted here.
3.3 CP-ABE
CP-ABE method is conceptually close to traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
In this section, we present the construction of access tree, procedure of satisfying an access
tree, and the four main algorithms of CP-ABE.
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3.3.1 CP-ABE Model
A sensitive message is encrypted under the access tree and a private key used to decrypt
must have an attribute set S satisfying the access tree.
Access Tree T
An access tree T is constructed with AND and OR gates. Each internal node x of T is a
threshold gate attached with a threshold value kx. Assume there are numx children nodes
of the internal node x, CP-ABE assigns indexes of the children nodes from 1 to numx.
When kx = numx, the threshold gate is an AND gate and when kx = 1, the threshold
gate is an OR gate.
Several functions are defined to facilitate the working with access trees. Like function
parent(x) returns the parent of node x. Function att(x) represents the attribute that
attached with node x when x is a leaf node. The number associated with each node is
represented as index(x). Where the index values are uniquely assigned to nodes in the
access structure for a given key in an arbitrary manner. Those functions are also utilized
in our FA scheme.
Satisfying Access Tree
Denote r the root node of access tree. For an arbitrary node x in the access tree, Tx
represents a sub-tree rooted at node x. A special case is when x = r, Tx is the access tree
itself. If an attribute set S satisfy Tx, we set Tx(S) = 1.
Satisfying access tree is a recursive procedure starting from the root node. If x has no
child, then Tx(S) = 1 if and only if att(x) ∈ S. If x has children, we set Tx(S) to 1 if and
only if at least kx children return 1 where kx is the threshold value associated with x.
The procedure of satisfying access tree is used to select the matching secret key com-
ponents when decrypt the cipher-text.
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3.3.2 Construction of CP-ABE
CP-ABE construction is based on a symmetric bilinear pairing. There are four main
procedures of CP-ABE, Setup, Encrypt, Delegate and Decrypt. The detailed discription
of the four procedures can be found in [6] and hence is omitted in the thesis.
3.4 Bilinear Maps
Benefits such as a broader choice of elliptic curve implementations and more compact rep-
resentations of group elements make asymmetric bilinear pairing more favourable if the
symmetry is not explicitly required by a cryptographic scheme [7]. Hence, an asymmet-
ric bilinear pairing is adopted in our cryptographic scheme. Some basic definitions and
denotations about groups with efficient computable bilinear maps are introduced below.
Denote G1,G2 and GT three multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q. Define the
generators of G1 and G2 as g1 and g2 respectively. Then the efficiently computable bilinear
pairing or bilinear map is e : G1 ×G2 → GT . Bilinear map e has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zq, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
Tuple (q, g1, g2, G1, G2, GT ) is called an asymmetric bilinear setting when G1 6= G2. If
G1 = G2 = G, and g is a generator of G, then the tuple (q, g, G, GT ) is a symmetric
bilinear setting.
3.5 Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent As-
sumption
Waters proposes the decisional parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption [21]
and introduces the security of CP-ABE on this assumption. Under a generalization for
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asymmetric pairings, we introduce the computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent
assumption as follows:
We continue to use the notations of bilinear pairing from section 3.4. Let s ∈ Zq be the
target secret that adversary intends to recover and K be the threshold value attached with
the target node. Denote W˜ as an index set of secret shares and sets W˜ ′ and W˜ ′′, where
|W˜ ′′| < K, are two disjoint subsets of W˜ . Random numbers r, a, s, β, x1, x2, ..., xN , y1,
y2, ..., yN , µ1, µ2, ..., µN , r1, r2, ..., rN are chosen from Zq. Tuple
y¯ =(g1, g2, g
y1
2 , g
y2
2 , ..., g
yN
2 , g
µ1y1
1 , g
µ2y2
1 , ..., g
µNyN
1 ,
g
µtr′t
1 , g
r′t
2 , g
ra+µtr′′t
1 , g
r′′t
2 )|∀t′ ∈ W˜ ′, ∀t′′ ∈ W˜ ′′
(3.18)
is given. To distinguish a random element T ∈ GT from e(g1, g2)ras is referred to as
the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem (d-BDHE). Let an algorithm B
outputting z ∈ {0, 1} has advantage  in solving d-BDHE in (G1, G2) if
|Pr[B(y¯, e(g1, g2)ras) = 0]− Pr[B(y¯, T ) = 0]| ≥ . (3.19)
Definition 1 The divisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption holds if no
polynomial algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the d-BDHE problem.
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Chapter 4
Fuzzy Authorization
We present the construction of fuzzy authorization (FA) in this chapter. First, we present
the system model and overview of our protocol in Section 4.1. The access tree structure
is established in Section 4.2. Then in Section 4.3, the archive format is introduced. The
transformation from LSSS to GRS code is introduced in Section 4.4. We provide the main
procedures and algorithms of FA in Section 4.5. At last, a comparison of FA and Fuzzy
IBE adapted in authorization is demonstrated in Section 4.6.
4.1 System Model and Overview of FA
In this section, we present an overview of the system architecture, the compendium of
protocol procedure and notations of our system as shown in Table 4.1. After that, several
possible adversary models are demonstrated.
4.1.1 Overview of Protocol
There are four main parties in the system as displayed in Fig. 4.1. We assume that all
parties hold validate public-key certificates from Certificate Authorities and communica-
tions among the four parties are protected by Transport Layer Security (TLS) channels.
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Table 4.1: Notations In The Thesis.
Notations Descriptions
ω The overall attribute set
ω′ The attribute set of files
ω′′ The attribute set of ASPs
e Maximum number of error
e Error vector
s Syndrome vector
γ Vector of code locators
v Vector of column multipliers
W˜ Index set of secret shares
W˜ ′ Subset of W˜ ; ∀t′ ∈ W˜ ′, gutr′t1 and gr
′
t
2 are known by adversary
W˜ ′′ Subset of W˜ ; ∀t′′ ∈ W˜ ′′, gra+utr′t1 and gr
′′
t
2 are known by adversary
Pf (x) Polynomial attached to file sub-tree
Pa(x) Polynomial attached to application sub-tree
U The index set {1, 2, ..., N}
Y The set of all the leaf nodes in T
Y ′ Subset of Y ; contains all the leaf nodes in F-subtree
Y ′s Subset of Y ′; a selected set of leaf nodes to perform interpolation
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Figure 4.1: Example of System Model
Session tokens are adopted against replay attack during authentication. A final assump-
tion is that only owner has writing permission to cloud storage while application service
providers merely have a permission of reading.
• Application service provider (ASP): an application software resides on the vendor’s
system and is accessed by users through a web browser or through a special purpose
client software provided by the vendor. For example, http://pdfmerge.w69b.com/ is
a website to merge several pdf files into one pdf file online. ASP and application are
interchangeable in this thesis.
• Cloud storage provider (CSP): the entity which supplies storage as service to its
clients and also provides access Application Platform Interfaces (APIs) to ASPs when
ASPs hold an access token. Dropbox and JustCloud mentioned previously are such
entities.
• Application store (AS): an entity with which the application service providers must
21
be registered to ensure the integrity of the applications. Google Chrome Web Store
is a typical application store.
• Data owner: an entity who stores his or her data inside cloud storage and wishes to
utilize cloud application services.
The protocol contains two phases, oﬄine phase and running phase. In the oﬄine phase,
data owner encrypts his or her data with a random symmetric key KE and encrypts KE
with our modified CP-ABE scheme, see details in Section 4.6. Then owner encapsulates
cipher-text of KE and cipher-text of data as an archive file and stores the archive in the
cloud. Format of the archive is defined in Section 4.3.
In the protocol running phase, when owner needs to share data with an ASP, she and
CSP join together to issue ASP the indirect secret shares of file attributes while AS and
owner collaborate to issue the indirect secret shares of application attributes. Indirect
share means that the genuine secret share is an exponent or a part of exponent of a group
elements. For example, when s1 is known as a secret share and g1 is a group element, g
s1r
1
is an indirect secret share.
In this thesis, we emphasize the flexibility of multiple-file sharing and therefore in our
construction, the fuzziness is realized for the file attributes. As soon as ASP gets all the
indirect secret shares, it will send a request to CSP for a formatted archive and then
perform the decryption of archive header for KE. With KE, ASP decrypts the data
cipher-text. The main objective of this thesis is to propose a secure and feasible way to
address file-sharing issue with high scalability and flexibility in cloud storage, the method
of owner accessing the resource data is not included in the scheme.
4.1.2 Adversary Models
Although entities do not trust each other, we assume that every entity will execute the
protocol honestly. We consider the following five adversary situations.
1. CSP is trusted to provide storage services properly but may wants to access owner’s
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data illegally. CSP may take advantage of the indirect shares that he possesses and
query the other indirect shares so as to reconstruct the top secret.
2. ASP may try to decrypt the unauthorized files by utilizing the previous indirect
shares that issued to him. ASP is allowed to query for the indirect shares that he
does not possess.
3. Application store which is in involved in issuing the indirect application secret shares
may try to access to owner’s data in the name of an ASP. Since he knows part of
the indirect shares of application attributes, he may desire to query about the rest
of indirect shares of application attributes and obtain the complete indirect shares
of application attributes.
4. An adversary owner may impersonate other owners to construct the indirect secret
shares with its own secret key.
5. Targeting on the secret keys and access tokens, general network attacks might be
launched by internet hackers.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of authorization. Owner wishes to use pdfmerge, a cloud
service provider to merge several pdf files stored in Dropbox into one pdf file. Instead of
sharing the symmetric key KE directly with pdfmerge, owner encrypts the KE with mod-
ified CP-ABE and issues the secret key SK of CP-ABE to pdfmerge. Owner and Dropbox
co-work together to issue the first part of SK and the common part D to pdfmerge. Then
the owner and Google Chrome Web Store collaborate to issue the second part of SK to
pdfmerge. After receiving the SK, pdfmerge requests for the encrypted file directly from
Dropbox and Dropbox transmit the encrypted files to pdfmerge.
4.2 Access Tree Structure
Properly arranging access policy and inserting additional nodes at suitable places when
authorize will help us achieve scalability and flexibility.
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Figure 4.2: System Model
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Figure 4.3: Access Tress Structure
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4.2.1 Construction of Access Tree
Access tree structures are the same for all the files, but we assign different polynomials
for the root nodes of access trees. The symmetric key KE used to encrypt the sensitive
data is then encrypted under the access tree. Access trees are constructed with stan-
dard techniques [6] through ANDing operation. Sub-tree of file attributes, sub-tree of
application attributes and the TimeSlot attribute are ANDed at the tree root node, as
shown in Fig. 4.3(a). For abbreviation, let us call sub-tree of file attributes as F-sub-tree
and sub-tree of application attributes as A-subtree. All file attributes, such as FileName,
FileLocation, FileType, FileOwner, FilePermission etc. are ANDed at the root node of
F-subtree. While A-subtree contains attributes like AppStore, AppName, AppExpireDate,
AppFunctionality, AppAuthor, AppAddress etc. All the attributes are attached with leaf
nodes which are drawn as dashed circles in Fig. 4.3(a) and Fig. 4.3(b). Each node in the
tree is labelled with one index number. From now on, we will use indexes to represent
the nodes. A polynomial attached with F-subtree root node is denoted as Pf (x) and a
polynomial attached with root node of A-subtree is called Pa(x).
4.2.2 Adding Checking Nodes into the Tree
Before each authorization, owner chooses to enable the checking nodes or to disable the
usage of checking nodes. If no redundant node is inserted, the issued secret key could only
decrypt one single file without any security loss. However, in many occasions, applications
need to access more than just one archive. For example, pdfmerge needs to access several
pdf files to perform merging. By inserting appropriate number of redundant checking nodes
into F-subtree, a token issued to the application could be used to decrypt different archives.
Fig. 4.3(a) displays an example of adding two redundant nodes in the F-subtree which gives
us one error tolerance. In Fig. 4.3(b), values of additional nodes are evaluated as Pf (n+1)
and Pf (n + 1). The new cipher components of the additional nodes are computed and
appended to the archive.
Similarly, owner could insert the additional nodes in the A-subtree to empower one
token to be used by several application. Further more, adding additional nodes in both
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sub-trees will result in multiple applications gain access to multiple files. For simplicity,
we only consider inserting redundant nodes in the F-subtree in this thesis.
4.3 Archive Format
In this section, we first present the archive format which supports the fuzzy authorization.
The archive file mainly contains three parts, header, encrypted data, and the integrity tag.
The format of the archive file is shown as follows.
< Archive > = < Header >ABE || < Data >KE || < InteTag > (4.1)
where < Data >KE is the protected data encrypted with symmetric key KE, < InteTag >
is the integrity tag generated from < Header >ABE || < Data >KE. The structure
< Header >ABE is relatively complex which is given as
< Header > = < FileDesc > || < EncryptionMeth > || < InteMeth >
|| < KE > || < KV > || < A >,
(4.2)
where< FileDesc > represents the description of protected-file content. < EncryptionMeth >
denotes the symmetric-key algorithm used to encrypted the data, < InteTMeth > is a set
of algorithm used to generate an integrity tag, such as RSA-MD5, RSA-SHA1, DSA-MD5,
DSA-SHA1 etc., and < KV > is the asymmetric key used to verify an integrity tag.
In our authorization, with the insertion of additional nodes, extra ciphertext contents
need to be added as well. Hence the previous < InteTag > is replaced with a new
< InteTag >. Alternatively, owner computes several < InteTag >s beforehand, and uses
the right < InteTag > when authorize.
4.4 Transformation from Shamir’s Linear Secret Shar-
ing Scheme to GRS
From Shamir’s (K, N) threshold scheme and GRS encoding and decoding algorithms, there
is a transformation from secret distributing to GRS encoding and from secret recovery to
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GRS decoding [32]. A detailed transformations from one to another is provided here.
4.4.1 Transformation From Secret Distributing to GRS Encod-
ing
By setting column multipliers vector v to (1, 1, ..., 1) and the code locator vector γ =
(x1, x2, ..., xN) where xi are the indexes of the nodes, the process of GRS encoding is
basicaly the secret distributing procedure.
4.4.2 Transformation From Secret Recovery to GRS Decoding
As shown in equations (3.3) and (3.17), interpolation is the kernel part of both secret
recovery and GRS decoding. The difference is that GRS codeword has N coordinates, of
which N −K are redundant and hence are used for error correction. So in order to take
advantage of error correction ability from GRS, we will add some checking nodes into the
access tree as redundant nodes in our scheme.
4.5 Main Procedures of Fuzzy Authorization
In lieu of using symmetric pairing which can be instantiated with merely suitable super-
singular elliptic curves, we adopt asymmetric pairing which will allow a greater variety of
constructed and ordinary curves to be used. A Type 2 bilinear pairing [33] is adopted here.
Recall that, G1, G2 and GT are cyclic groups of prime order q. Assume that Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard in G1. Let φ : G2 → G1 be an efficient computable group isomorphism.
Set g1 = φ(g2). A security parameter, k, will determine the size of those three groups. An
efficiently computable function is defined as e : G1 × G2 → GT . In addition, we are able
to choose a hash function H : (0, 1)∗ → G1 which will map any binary string to a random
element from G1 [34].
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4.5.1 Setup(k)
The setup algorithm, is first initiated by CSP. CSP chooses generators g1, g2 of G1 and
G2 and a bilinear map e : G1 ×G2 → GT of prime order q according to the input security
parameter k. Next CSP chooses a random exponent β and publishes the public key as:
CPK = 〈G1, G2, g, h = gβ1 , f = g1/β2 〉. (4.3)
CSP’s keeps CSK = 〈β, gγ2 〉 as its secret key.
Later, each owner chooses a random exponent α and computes its public key and private
key separately as
OPK = 〈e(g1, g2)α〉 and OSK = 〈gα2 〉. (4.4)
4.5.2 Encrypt(CPK, OPK, m, T )
Performed by owner, this algorithm encrypts a secret key KE under the access tree T .
Let Y denote the set of all the leaf nodes of T and py(x) be the polynomial that assigned
to a leaf node y. Then the cipher-text CT is given by
CT =〈T , C˜ = KE · e(g1, g2)αs, C = hs,
∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gpy(0)2 , C ′y = H(att(y))py(0)〉.
(4.5)
If later 2e checking nodes are added, where e > 0, owner also computes the cipher com-
ponents of checking nodes as Cn+1 = g
pn+1(0)
2 , Cn+1 = g
pn+2(0)
2 , ..., Cn+2e = g
pn+2e(0)
2 and
C ′n+1 = H(att(n+1))
pn+1(0), C ′n+2 = H(att(n+2))
pn+2(0), ..., C ′n+2e = H(att(n+2e))
pn+2e(0)
where n+ i are the indexes of checking nodes.
4.5.3 KeyGen(CSK, OSK, ω)
The algorithm requires CSP, owner, ASP and AS to collaborate together to issue access
token and secret key without revealing their secret keys to each other. Taking secret keys
of CSP and owner, together with a set of attributes ω as input, the procedure will output
common part D and a set of indirect secret shares of secret key.
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First, Owner and CSP work together to compute D = g
(α+ra)/β
2 in which r ∈ Zq is
chosen by CSP and a ∈ Zq is selected by owner. The sequence of interactions ensures
that owner only knows gra2 and CSP is merely aware of g
(α+ra)/β
2 using method in [5]. The
common part D is sent by CSP to ASP.
Let ω′ be the file attribute set and ω′′ be the application attribute set, then the overall
attribute set ω = {TimeSlot} ∪ ω′ ∪ ω′′. After receiving the appointed file attribute set
and time slot attribute, i.e., ω′ ∪ {TimeSlot} from owner, for any i ∈ ω′ ∪ {TimeSlot},
CSP randomly chooses ri ∈ Zq and computes H(i)ri . Then owner computes gra2 H(i)ri and
sends them to ASP. ASP then authenticates itself to AS and presents the attributes of ω′′.
If authentication succeeds, for all j ∈ ω′′, AS will choose rj ∈ ω′′ and compute H(j)rj .
Again owner computes gra2 H(j)
rj and sends them to ASP. This algorithm ends up with
ASP getting the SK which is represented as
SK = 〈D = g(α+ra)/β2 , ∀t ∈ ω : Dt = gra1 H(t)rt , D′t = grt2 〉. (4.6)
4.5.4 Delegate(SK, ω˜)
The algorithm takes in a secret key SK with which an attribute set ω is embedded and
another attribute set ω˜ ⊂ ω. Normally, this algorithm is used by an ASP. The algorithm
first chooses a random value r˜ ∈ Zq and for alll ∈ ω˜, r˜l ∈ Zq are randomly picked. After
that, a new private key S˜K for an attribute set ω˜ is generated as
S˜K = {D˜ = Df r˜,∀k ∈ ω˜ : D˜k = Dkgr˜a1 H(k)r˜k , D˜′k = D′kgr˜k2 }. (4.7)
4.5.5 DecryptandErrorCorrect(CT, SK, T )
The decryption algorithm is a recursive procedure over the access structure T comprising
four steps. The algorithm is conducted by ASP.
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Decryption on the Node
Let DecryptNode(CT, SK, x) denote the function that takes ciphertext CT, secret key SK
and the node x in the tree as input. If x is a leaf node of the tree,
DecryptNode(CT, SK, x) =
e(Di, Cx)
e(C ′x, D
′
i)
=
e(gra1 H(i)
ri , g
P ′x(0)
2 )
e(H(i)qy(0), gri2 )
= e(g1, g2)
raP ′x(0).
(4.8)
If x is the root node of F-subtree where the additional nodes are added, then for all child
nodes z of x, the algorithm calls DecryptNode(CT, SK, z) and stores the result as
fz = e(g1, g2)
raP ′z(0). (4.9)
If the secret key issued is not designed to decrypt this file, i.e., the attributes set based
on which the secret key is issued does not satisfy the access tree, error checking and error
correction is needed. Note that, the attribute sets attached with access trees do not have
any errors. We adopt the terminology of error correcting code. Here we use GRS for
reconstructing the top secret. Thus, a single key can decrypt multiple files for which the
attribute sets have distance less than or equal to η.
Error Checking
Let e be the maximum number of errors that can be tolerated. Then at least 2e additional
nodes are added in the sub-tree. Error checking will be enforced and further error correction
may be performed depends on the result of error checking.
According to the way we construct the access structure, the code locator vector is
γ = (4, 5, ..., l, n+ 1, n+ 2, ..., n+ 2e) and column multiplier vector is v = (1, 1, ..., 1)
with the length of N = l − 3 + 2e which is also the number of leaf nodes in the sub-
tree. Parity check matrix H can be easily obtained through equation (3.6) with γ and v.
Because the symbols of codeword or secret shares are exponents of e(g1, g2), resembling
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computing syndromes in equations (3.7) and (3.8), the checking procedure is performed
over the exponent of e(g1, g2) and the derived syndrome vector can be represented as
s′ =(s′1, s
′
2, ..., s
′
N)
=(e(g1, g2)
ra
∑n−1
j=0 ejvjγ
0
j , e(g1, g2)
ra
∑n−1
j=0 ejvjγj1, ..., e(g1, g2)
ra
∑n−1
j=0 ejvjγ
N−1
j ).
(4.10)
An all-one vector s′ indicates no error, therefore no further correction will be needed. In
this case, the decryption procedure continues to interpolate Fx = e(g1, g2)
Pf (0). On the
other hand, a non-all-one vector of s′ indicates that error(s) does exist and the algorithm
tries to correct the error(s).
Error Correction
Given leaf nodes set Y ′ = {4, 5, ..., l, n + 1, n + 2, ..., n + 2e}, construct the subset Y ′s =
{j1, j2, ..., jK} ⊂ Y ′ which will give us (NK) different Y ′s. For each set Y ′s, do interpolation
as
e(g1, g2)
raP ′f (x) = e(g1, g2)
ra
K∑
t=1
∏
∀i∈Y′,i 6=jt
(x−i)fjt
jt−i
.
(4.11)
(NK) results will be obtained. According to [31], the most often occurring result shall be
selected and used to obtain another vector
f ′z =(e(g1, g2)
raP ′f (4), e(g1, g2)
raP ′f (5), ..., e(g1, g2)
raP ′f (l),
e(g1, g2)
raP ′f (n+1), e(g1, g2)
raP ′f (n+2), ..., e(g1, g2)
raP ′f (n+2e)).
(4.12)
Let d(fz, f
′
z) denote the distance between fz and f
′
z. If d(fz, f
′
z) ≤ bN−K2 c = e, set
e(g1, g2)
raPf (0) = e(g1, g2)
raP ′f (0). Otherwise, error correction procedure fails and the de-
cryption aborts. The reason why decoding process cannot be replaced by Berlekamp-Welch
algorithm or PGZ decoding algorithm will be discussed later.
Final Decryption
If error checking and decoding go smoothly, we will get A = DecryptNode(CT, SK, r) =
e(g1, g2)
ras. The encrypted message KE can be computed by
KE = Decrypt(CT, SK) =
C˜
e(C,D)/A
=
C˜
e(gβs1 , g
(α+ra)/β
2 )/e(g1, g2)
ras
(4.13)
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Analysis of Other Decoding Algorithms
Decoding with Berlekamp-Welch Algorithm
We adapt the two steps of Berlekamp-Welch algorithm to our scheme.
1. Given FZi= e(g1, g2)
raP (αi), i = 1, 2, ..., N , the decoder tries to interpolate e(g1, g2)
raQ(x)
and e(g1, g2)
raE(x) under some confinements. Since the elements of codeword are given
as exponents, the interpolation would be similar to regular operation as soon as we
replace the regular summation with multiplication and change normal multiplication
to power operation.
2. Computing e(g1, g2)
raP (0), i.e. e(g1, g2)
ra
Q(0)
E(0) .
Unfortunately, even the decoder interpolate the e(g1, g2)
raQ(x) and e(g1, g2)
raE(x), given
e(g1, g2)
raE(0), there is no efficient way to compute e(g1, g2)
1
E(0) over Zq. As a result, de-
coding with Berlekamp-Welch algorithm will be hardly fulfilled in this scenario.
Decoding with PGZ Algorithm
In order to find the coefficients of error locator polynomial, equation (3.16) must be
solved for regular GRS decoding. While in our case, the equation (3.16) can be decomposed
and derived into the following equation set:
e(g1, g2)
ra
e−1∑
i=0
siEe−1−i
= e(g1, g2)
−rase
e(g1, g2)
ra
e∑
i=1
siEe−i
= e(g1, g2)
−rase+1
...
e(g1, g2)
ra
2e−2∑
i=e−1
siE2e−2−i
= e(g1, g2)
−ras2e−1
(4.14)
where there is no efficient computable method to compute e(g1, g2)
raEi without knowing
si. To summarize, PGZ algorithm does not apply to this scenario.
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4.5.6 Time Slot Synchronization
We divide time zone into small intervals, not necessarily of the same length. In each
time interval, polynomials attached to the access structures of archives are updated. The
main idea of lazy re-encryption [23] is used in our system regarding to re-encrypt sensitive
data. When an application’s access right is revoked, lazy revocation allows to postpone
the update of polynomials and re-encryption of sensitive data until writing action has
happened. Because only data owner has writing permission, time slot synchronization
happens when owner updates the file. In the beginning of each time slot, CSP and owner
needs to collaborate together to re-encrypt the header file. LetM denote the children set
of the root node, and |M| = m. Assume the time-slot attribute is attached with node i∗,
i∗ = 1 in Fig.2, timeslot synchronization procedure initiates with owner chooses a random
value s˜t, set the most up-to-date TimeSlot share as
P (i∗)t = PTS(0)t = PTS(0)t−1 + s˜t. (4.15)
New cipher-text components for a new time slot can be obtained as CTSt = g
P (i∗)t and
C ′TSt = H(TimeSlot)
P (i∗)t . From equation (3.4), the top secret can be obtained. More
precisely,
st = P (0)t
=
i∗−1∑
u=1
∏
∀i∈M,i 6=u
(0− i)P (u)
u− i
+
∏
∀i∈M,i 6=i∗
(0− i)P (i∗)t
i∗ − i
+
m∑
u=i∗+1
∏
∀i∈M,i 6=u
(0− i)P (u)
u− i .
(4.16)
So the discrepancy between st and st−1 can be obtained based on equations (4.15) and (4.16)
∆s =st − st−1
=
∏
∀i∈M,i 6=i∗
(0− i)P (i∗)t
i∗ − i −
∏
∀i∈M,i 6=i∗
(0− i)P (i∗)t−1
i∗ − i
=
∏
∀i∈M,i 6=i∗
0− i
i∗ − i s˜t.
(4.17)
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Owner ASP
ServiceReq, F ileAddress
Redirect, [AttributeSet, RedirectURI]ASP
Figure 4.4: Service Request Flow
Number i∗ is constant, so as
∏
∀i∈M,i 6=i∗
0−i
i∗−i , the most left part of ∆s. Hence the new
ciphertext’s main component C˜ can be updated as C˜ = m · e(g1, g2)α(s+∆s) and C as
C = h(s+∆s).
4.6 Fuzzy Authorization Protocol Flow
The flow of Fuzzy Authorization (FA) involves in four on-line protocols. With the require-
ment of adding checking nodes, FA protocol needs to re-encapsulate the archive file.
4.6.1 Service Request
1. Owner initiates by sending a request ServiceReq along with the files’ addresses to
ASP, for example, pdfmerge, http://www.pdfmerge.com/.
2. ASP redirects data owner’s user agent to the authorization endpoint of CSP. ASP
includes its identifier, functionality, local state and a redirection URI attributes to
which the authorization server will send the user-agent back once access is granted(or
denied).
4.6.2 Token and Secret Key Issuing
1. From the redirect command, owner’s user agent passes the redirect command con-
taining a targeted application attribute set and the redirect URI to CSP. An example
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ASP Owner CSP AS
1. Redirect, [AttributeSet, RedirectURI]ASP
2. HTTP Form
3. ID,Credentials
4. AttributeSet, RedirectURI
5. D′j
6. ∀j ∈ ω ∪ {TimeSlot}, D′j;∀i ∈ ω′, D′′i
7. gα+ra2
8. Redirect[g
(α+ra)/β
2 , AuthzCodeASP ]AA
8. Redirect[g
(α+ra)/β
2 , AuthzCodeASP ]AA
9. Di,∀i ∈ {TS} ∪ ω;D′′j ,∀j ∈ ω′
10. REQ[IDapp, RedirectURI]
11. D′′j = g
rj∀j ∈ ω′′
Figure 4.5: Token and Secret Key Issuing Flow
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of redirection command and attribute set is given as follows.
Redirect1 =[AttributeSet, RedirectURI]ASP
where AttributeSet ={AppStore, AppID,AppExpireDate,
AppFunctionality, AppAuthor, AppAddress}.
(4.18)
The subscript ASP means that content in the square brackets are digitally signed
by ASP.
2. CSP sends owner the authentication HTTP Form.
3. Owner fills her ID and credentials and submits the form to authenticate herself to
CSP.
4. If the authentication succeeds, CSP generates an authorization code AutzCode (a
nonce) and sends AS a command including ASP attribute set and redirect URI to
request for the partial application key components from AS. The request command
is shown as follows.
ReqAppAttPart1 = [AttributeSet, RedirectURI]CSP
5. Application store retrieves applications attributes from AttributeSet, then ∀j ∈
AttributeSet, application store generates partial part-1 D′j = H(j)
rj and replies
it to CSP. The part-2 D′′j = g
rj
2 is sent to ASP when ASP authenticate itself to AS
in the later step.
6. The CSP, on the other hand, ∀i ∈ ω′ ∪ {TimeSlot} generates partial part-1 D′i =
H(i)ri and part-2 D′′i = g
ri . And CSP randomly selects r ∈ Zq. Then the part-1 and
the part-2 signed by the CSP, gr , and the partial part-1 Dj
′ of ASP received earlier
are sent to the owner.
7. Owner verifies whether D′j, D
′′
j where ∀i ∈ ω′ ∪ {TimeSlot} are valid by computing
bilinear pairing e(D′i, g) = e(D
′′
i , H(i)). If the verification succeeds, the owner ran-
domly chooses a, computes gα+ra2 from a, g
r
2 and the owner secret key g
α
2 . Owner then
replies to the CSP with the result gα+ra2 .
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8. CSP generates the common part D = g
(α+ra)/β
2 from the MSK β and g
α+ra
2 received
from owner. Hence, with ElGamal-like mask, we prevent CSP from knowing about
owner secret key gα2 , and owner from knowing CSP’s master secret key β. CSP
encrypts the common part D and the authorization code AutzCode with ASPs public
key and signs with the its private key, before sending the owner a redirect command
Redirect[g
(α+ra)/β
2 , AuthzCodeASP ]AA to redirect the user-agent back to the consumer
with the redirection URI received earlier.
9. The owner binds all partial key components by multiplying them with gra1 and sends
all key components Di = g
ra
1 D
′
i, ∀i ∈ ω ∪ {TimeSlot} and Dj = gra1 D′′j ,∀j ∈ ω′ to
the application service provider.
10. The application service provider sends the authority a command
REQ[IDapp, RedirectURI]
to authenticate itself and to request the partial part-2 key components of application
attributes.
11. If authentication succeeds, application store replies to the application service provider
with the partial part-2 D′′j = g
rj
2 ,∀j ∈ ω′′ of application components.
Note that, the detail of how application service providers are authenticated by appli-
cation store are beyond the scope. However, readers can get a general idea of this process
through Google Accounts Authentication and Authorization [35].
4.6.3 File Access
The file access protocol is similar as OAuth 2.0 [4]. Also, compare to other protocol
procedures, it is rather easy and simple.
1. The application accesses archive files by presenting the access token to the CSP.
2. The CSP validates the access token and ensures that it has not expired and that its
scope covers the requested resource.
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3. If the access token is valid, then CSP will transmit the required archive file to ASP.
4.6.4 TimeSlot Synchronization
The procedure of time slot synchronization is presented below.
1. Assume owner updates the plain data at time t, he chooses a new random value st
and computes e(g, g)α∆s using its OPK = e(g, g)α. Owner now sends e(g, g)α∆s and
st to the CSP.
2. CSP computes the new TimeSlot share as PTS(0)t = PTS(0)t−1 + st. Then the
new cipher-text components for the new time slot can be computed as CTSt =
gPTS(0)tandC ′TSt = H(TimeSlot)
PTS(0)t where TimeSlot is the string of the tth time
slot. Also CSP updates C = hst from MPK = gβ.
3. Owner computes e(g, g)α∆s using its OPK = e(g, g)α and send it to the CSP.
4. CSP replaces two cipher-text components CTSt , C
′
TSt
and C = hst with the received
components according to the current time slot. CSP also computes the new cipher
C˜t = C˜t−1 · e(g, g)α∆s .
4.7 Difference Between Fuzzy Authorization and Other
Solutions
Fuzzy Authorization (FA) maintains the confidentiality of data with symmetric encryption
and encrypts the symmetric key with modified CP-ABE. Integrity tags are computed so
that it is convenient for data owner and authorized parties to check the integrity without
any TPAs. Especially, FA provides an scalable, efficient and flexible access control by
exploiting the modified CP-ABE to adapt to the cloud storage environment. Requiring
no third authority parties, FA is totally practical and feasible in the industrial world for
all the entities involved already exist. Moreover, we enable the fuzziness of authorization
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by transforming secret reconstruction to GRS decoding to take advantage of GRS error
correction ability. Through assembling fuzziness functionality into system, we enhance
scalability and flexibility at the price of minor security loss.
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Chapter 5
Security Analysis
In this section, our system is analyzed from perspectives of internal and external adver-
saries. For internal adversaries, all entities in the system are considered to be semi-trusted,
in the sense that they can exploit threats to subvert authorization control and data secu-
rity, but still honestly follow the protocol. As to external adversaries, they may not run the
protocol but try to launch general attacks to compromise the security of data. We will first
give security analysis for internal adversary models provided that adversaries can get the
cipher-text CT = 〈T , C˜ = m·e(g1, g2)αs, C = hs,∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gqy(0)2 , C ′y = H(att(y))qy(0)〉.
According to our access structure, in order to recover the top secret s, the adverse party
has to recover PTS(0), Pf (0) and Pa(0) in the first place.
5.1 CSP Tries To Illegally Access or Modify Owner’s
Plain Data
Without any collusion with other parties, cloud server is able to get the TimeSlot and file
attributes, that is {TimeSlot} ∪ ω′. For any t ∈ {TimeSlot} ∪ ω′, cloud server can obtain
H(t)rt and grt2 , however, not g
ra
2 H(t)
rt .
1. Scenario 1. Let the target secret be PTS(0) and the threshold value is K = 1, then
we can settle set W˜ = {TimeSlot}, W˜ ′ = W˜ and W˜ ′′ = ∅ where W˜ , W˜ ′ and W˜ ′′ are
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notations defined in the d-BDHE assumption. Clearly, |W˜ ′′| = 0 < K = 1 satisfies
and therefore the d-BDHE assumption holds.
2. Scenario 2. Let the target secret be Pf (0) and the threshold value of F-subtree’s root
node be K, then W˜ = ω′, W˜ ′ = W˜ = ω′ and W˜ ′′ = ∅. Again, inequity |W˜ ′′| = 0 < K
satisfies and our assumption still holds in this scenario. Since CSP has no information
about application attributes, it is impossible for it to guess Pa(0).
3. Scenario 3. Setting our target secret as the top secret s and the threshold value
K = 3, then W˜ = {1, 2, 3} in which the set elements are indexes of children of the
root node. Also, W˜ ′ = ∅ and W˜ ′′ = ∅ and |W˜ ′′| = 0 < K = 3. As a consequence, it
remains difficult for CSP to get the top secret s.
5.2 ASP Tries to Decrypt Owner’s Data without Per-
mission
Two cases must be considered if ASP tries to access Owner’s data illegally. The first case
is that, an ASP is registered with an AS, but has never be requested by owner to fetch and
handle owner’s data. The second is, an ASP registered with an AS and has been issued a
token to access a certain file, but tries to access the file illegally after owner has updated
the file. The second occasion is more severe since the ASP holds indirect file attributes
shares.
1. Scenario 4. In the first occasion, TimeSlot is not known by ASP, neither attributes
of F-subtree. However, as to the application attribute set ω′′, for any t ∈ ω′′, ASP
could randomly choose rt, and fabricates D˜t = H(t)
rt and grt2 . Obviously, setting
our target secret to PTS(0) and Pf (0) will leads us to Scenario 1 and Scenario 2
separately. If ASP sets the target secret as Pa(0) and the threshold of A-subtree,
a positive integer, to K. Then we will have W˜ = ω′, W˜ ′ = W˜ and W˜ ′′ = ∅ with
|W˜ ′′| = 0 < K. Once again, the d-BDHE assumption holds.
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2. Scenario 5. In the second occasion, not only sub-trees of file attributes and application
attributes are acquainted to ASP, but also Pf (0) and Pa(0). Even though, ASP could
forge the random exponent rt for TimeSlot attribute and get H(TS)
rt , grt2 , there is
no way for ASP to guess gra1 H(TS)
rt . Setting the target secret as the top secret s
and threshold value K = 3, W˜ = {1, 2, 3}, W˜ ′ = {TimeSlot} and W˜ ′′ = {2, 3} where
|W˜ ′′| = 2 < K = 3. Hence, the d-BDHE assumption applies to this scenario as well.
5.3 AS Tries to Access Owner’s Data Illegally
It is clear to find that attributes exposed to AS are application attributes and thus W˜ = ω′′.
Similar as we reduce the adverse CSP model to d-BDHE assumption, we can also reduce
this adverse model to our assumption. Hence it is impractical for AS to recover the top
secret s.
5.4 Owner Propose Tokens to Access Other Owners’
File
A vicious owner may either pretend to be an innocent owner to issue tokens or she may
fabricate the tokens in place of another owner. The former case is unlikely for the vicious
owner has to authenticate herself to CSP. As to the latter case, the vicious owner may
fabricate the partial components of indirect secret shares attached with file attributes and
application attributes and multiply them with her own gra
′
1 . Alternatively put, for any t ∈
ω(ω is the attribute set that is appointed by the innocent owner), an owner may fabricate
H(t)rt and grt2 and combine them with g
ra′
1 . Even in the best case, the ominous owner
will get e(g1, g2)
ra′s and e(g1, g2)
(ra+α)s. With e(g1, g2)
ra′s and e(g1, g2)
(ra+α)s to compute
e(g1, g2)
ras, the problem will be reduced to a discrete logarithm problem and hence the
fabrication is unsuccessful.
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Chapter 6
Implementation of Fuzzy
Authorization
In this chapter, we present an implementation of FA protocol and their performance. The
implementation environment and parameters chosen for communication among four parties
are first introduced in Section 6.1. Some optimizations of the implementation is presented
in Section 6.2. Comparisons with Fuzzy IBE adapted in authorization is demonstrated in
Section 6.3. Then measurements of performance is demonstrated in Section 6.4.
6.1 Parameter Selection and Simulation Environment
6.1.1 Pairing Implementation
Our implementation uses symmetric bilinear pairing which was implemented with pairing-
based cryptography (PBC) library [36] from Stanford University. A 160-bit elliptic curve
group G based on the supersingular curve y2 = x3 + x over 512-bit finite field is adopted.
Operations on the elements of group G, such as addition, negation and exponentiation are
computed through calling corresponding functions from PBC library. Random bits read
from Linux kernel file /dev/urandom are used to generate random number from Zq where
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q is the order of group G. Using a computer with 4 Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-2130 CPUs
running at 3.40GHz.
6.1.2 Implementation of FA Protocol with OMNETPP
OMNET++ 4.2.2 is used to build the framework of the FA protocol. CSP, data owner,
ASP and AS are simulated as simple modules in the project. For simplicity, we fix the
number of CSP, ASP and AS as one for each, but the number of data owner is flexible
which can be assigned manually at the beginning of simulation. OMNET++ 4.2.2 provides
two self-defined methods, handleMessage() and activity(), to receive and deal with data
packets for each module. And each module has to choose one of them. In our project, we
adopt handleMessage() function due to its convenience of co-working with library PBC.
However, in our implementation, simulation time does not elapse in the function, in
other words, bilinear pairing and other relative computing time will not be counted in the
FA protocol, the experiment time we collected is simply the protocol running time.
6.1.3 Parameter Selection for Communication
FA protocol mainly facilitates user who are prone to use smart phones and tablets to access
the cloud storage. In order to make the simulation close to reality, before setting the param-
eters such as delay and bandwidth for simulation, we monitored communications between a
smart phone and online websites in real life with WebSitePulse [37] a tool used to monitor
internet communications. Depending on the websites smart phone accessed and the situa-
tion of WiFi to which smart phone connected, connection time and responding time varies.
The effective upload bandwidth of the WiFi is 500Kbps and download speed is 65KBps.
Under this circumstance, and after one thousand test for each cloud storage provider, there
exist 2ms delay of https://drive.google.com, 29ms delay of https://skydrive.live.com , and
69ms delay of https://dropbox.com. As a compromise, we set 15ms as the communication
delay between CSP and owner. The response delay of all the parties are summarized in
Table 6.1 Bandwidth of cloud storage provider is unlimited just as most cloud storage
providers set in real life [38] and so as bandwidth of application store. Upload bandwidth
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Table 6.1: Response Delay Parameters
Dropbox Chrome Web store Owner Device (Android) pdfmerge
15ms 10ms 49ms 20ms
of owner is 500Kpbs and download bandwidth is 65KBps, the same as the parameters of
real life smart phone communication.
6.2 Optimizations
For error correction, the original decoding algorithm is introduced in Chapter 3. Before
each interpolation, a set Y ′s of K indexes is chosen for all possibilities. Let k range from 1 to
(NK) and Y ′sk be the kth set. Combination in lexicographical order algorithm [39] is used and
further optimization could be done on top of it. In lexicographical order combination, the
next combination is constructed based on current combination and the difference between
them is only one component. So instead of conducting (NK) complete interpolations, the
optimized procedure will perform the first complete interpolation and rest (NK)− 1 partial
interpolations.
For each index ju ∈ Y ′sk , compute the corresponding exponential Lagrange polynomial
as
wk,ju(x) = e(g1, g2)
ra
∏
∀i∈Y′sk ,i6=ju
(x−i)Pf (ju)
ju−i
.
(6.1)
Then we will obtain set Wk = {wk,1(x), wk,2(x), ..., wk,K(x)} where wk,ju(x) is defined as
equation (6.1).
Denote the complementary set of Y ′sk as YCsk = {1, 2, ..., N}\Y ′sk . An index iold ∈ Y ′sk is
the old index to be replaced by the new index inew ∈ YCsk . Then the kth set Wk is updated
to Wk+1 as following:
1. ju ∈ Y ′sk and ju = iold,
wk+1,ju = wk,ju ; (6.2)
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2. ∀ju ∈ Y ′sk and ju 6= iold,
wk+1,ju = w
inew−ju
iold−ju
k,ju
. (6.3)
By keeping Wk up-to-date, the interpolation will always be
e(g1, g2)
raPf (x) = e(g1, g2)
ra
K∑
u=1
wk,ju
, u = 1, 2, ..., N. (6.4)
Before the optimization, for each set Y ′sk , interpolation will cost 1 + 2(K − 1) exponential
operations on the element from group GT and (NK)[1 + 2(K − 1)] exponentiation overall.
The optimization reduced 1 + 2(K − 1) exponential operations to 1 exponential operation
and the overall number of exponential operation is reduced from (NK)[1 + 2(K − 1)] to
2(K − 1) + (NK).
Another optimization can be adopted when performs the decryption over the root
of sub-tree where the checking nodes are added, e.g., F-subtree in our case. Instead of
computing the exponential polynomial Pf (x), unknown x can be replaced by node index
number. Thus the interpolation result is a potential indirect share. Replacing x with
indexes of root’s children nodes in turn, a set of new indirect secret shares will be obtained.
Instead of choosing the most frequently occurring polynomial, the advantage of parity check
matrix H could be used. For each new set of share components obtained, equations (3.7)
and (3.8) can be applied to check whether they are the correct share components. If (3.7)
and (3.8) are satisfied for a certain set of potential share components, stop interpolation
and set the unknown x to 0 to obtain e(g1, g2)
raPf (0).
6.3 Fuzzy IBE Adapted in Cloud Storage Authoriza-
tion
In order to compare the performance of FA, we apply two simple methods derived from
Fuzzy IBE proposed in [19]. The first solution of Fuzzy IBE is referred as Fuzzy IBE1 and
the second solution is denoted as Fuzzy IBE2.
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Figure 6.1: Access Trees of Fuzzy IBE1
6.3.1 First Solution of Fuzzy IBE
As shown in Fig. 6.1, for each file, owner creates multiple access trees with distinct thresh-
old values of F-subtrees. Different threshold values indicates different degrees of Pf (x)
attached with F-subtree. A smaller threshold gives us larger error-tolerant ability. There-
fore, for each access tree owner has to reconstruct the polynomial Pf (x) and compute the
corresponding Pf (i) where i is the node index number.
Then owner encrypts the symmetric key KE under these different trees to obtain
different cipher-texts. As a result, different cipher-texts matched with different access
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trees are stored together in the cloud server. At the beginning of authorization, owner
determines the error-tolerant ability and assigns one of the cipher-texts that will be sent to
ASP. Since ASP has no idea about the file attribute set, there is no way for ASP to perform
the satisfying an access tree procedure over F-sub-tree. Hence owner has to transmit the
file attribute set of application to ASP as well.
After receiving the file attribute set, cipher-text and the secret key, ASP first applies the
satisfying an access tree procedure to determine which key components of the attributes
are correct and can be used to perform decryption. Then, by making use of the Decryp-
tion procedure [19], ASP can obtain K correct indirect shares and recover the top secret,
finally get symmetric key KE. If the satisfying an access tree procedure fails, ASP quits
decryption and requests the secret key again.
Fuzzy IBE1 is simple, however a large amount of extra space and computation of
encryption are needed. In addition, owner has to transmit ASP the file attribute set.
Moreover, ASP also needs to run satisfying an access tree procedure to select the correct
key components so as to decrypt.
6.3.2 Second Solution of Fuzzy IBE
The second solution is that owner reserves some default attributes in the F-subtrees of
all the files and maintains the threshold values. This solution is denoted as Fuzzy IBE2
shown in Fig. 6.2. By increasing the number of these default attributes, owner enhances
the tolerance of error. The additional nodes’ values, i.e., Pf (i) where i is the index number
of additional nodes, are computed with polynomial Pf (x). Unlike Fuzzy IBE1 above, the
solution two does not require the reconstruction of the polynomials attached with extra
access trees. There is only one access tree for each file. Still the cipher-text components
of the additional default nodes are computed and inserted into the cipher-text.
Since ASP is not aware of the file attributes, owner has to send application the file
attributes along with the secret key, which is the same as Fuzzy IBE1. Before performing
decryption with the secret key, ASP needs to carry out satisfying an access tree proce-
dure with the received file attributes to determine which attributes are matched with the
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Figure 6.2: Access Trees of Fuzzy IBE2
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attributes attached with tree leaf nodes. Founded on the matched attributes, the corre-
sponding components of the secret key are selected to do decryption.
6.3.3 Comparisons of FA to Fuzzy IBE1 and Fuzzy IBE2
Similar to the second solution, our fuzzy authorization scheme adds additional attributes
into F-subtree. However, Fuzzy IBE2 requires owner to send the attribute set of file which
may result leakage of owner’s privacy. Also in Fuzzy IBE2, ASP has to perform satisfying
access tree procedure to determine which indirect shares can be utilized. According to the
property of Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code, by adding 2e additional attributes
in the tree, where e is the maximum number of errors that could be tolerated, fuzzy
authorization has the ability to check and correct errors. Then fuzzy authorization is
able to perform error correction when some of the attributes are not matched. When
every indirect shares are correct, the reconstruction of top secret key can be performed on
arbitrarily K out of N shares.
Thus unlike the two solutions derived from Fuzzy IBE, FA begins error correction at
the indirect share level while the two former solutions select the right key components at
attributes level. Therefore, fuzzy authorization avoids owner from sending file attributes to
ASP and eliminating the necessity of carrying out the satisfying an access tree procedure
by ASP. More importantly, FA avoids the privacy leakage of data owner.
The requirements of the three solutions are summarized in Table 6.2. In Table 6.2,
notations are given.
• R1 represents the operation that owner needs to send file attributes to ASP.
• R2 denotes that ASP needs to performs procedure of satisfying access tree.
• R3 stands for the leakage information of owner.
• R4 means the error checking operation should be performed.
• R5 means that error creation operation is required.
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Table 6.2: Comparison of FA, Fuzzy IBE1, and Fuzzy IBE2
Properties FA Fuzzy IBE1 Fuzzy IBE2
R1 No Yes Yes
R2 No Yes Yes
R3 No Yes Yes
R4 Yes No No
R5 Yes No No
6.4 Performance Measurements
6.4.1 Time Consumption
For single computation, the time is collected as following.
1. On average, it costs 1.14ms to compute bilinear pairing.
2. It costs 1.51ms and 0.14ms on average to complete exponentiation in G and GT
receptively.
3. Adding and multiplication operations cost 0.001ms and 0.09ms which are relatively
small.
4. For one authorization operation of 3 different files with one error tolerance, the
average overall time of our simulation is 1.187s.
Compare to other authorization schemes, FA utilizes error checking and correction. The
simulation results show that error checking and correction is not very time consuming. The
average time consumption of error checking and correction is shown in the following table.
Table 6.3 shows the time consumption of error checking and correction.
As to the transmission of file attribute set, at east one round trip time (RTT) is needed.
In the most commonly used 3G and 4G networks, the average RTT of these networks are
around or over 100ms [40]. Compare with the communication overhead cost by transmission
of file attribute set, error checking and correction is more efficient.
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Table 6.3: Time Consumption of Error Checking and Correction
Time Consumption Attribute Number in F-subtree Error Number
47.45ms 6 1
56.02ms 4 2
68.63ms 8 1
79.91ms 6 2
6.4.2 Extra Space Consumption
In the access tree, each leaf node is attached with an attribute y for which two cipher
components Cy = g
Py(0)
2 , C
′
y = H(y)
Py(0) must be added into the cipher-text. Assume total
number of leaf nodes of the access tree is n, and the number of F-subtree leaf nodes is n
2
.
Let l be the number of archives that could be decrypted with the same KE and e be the
maximum number of errors that can be tolerated. In our simulation, n = 16 and l ranges
from 1 to 10. Since FileName and FileLocation are the two attributes that most likely to
be different, two typical values of e = 1 and e = 1 are simulated.
For Fuzzy IBE1, fuzziness of authorization can be achieved by changing the threshold
value of F-subtree. Then polynomial Pf (x) and values of leaf nodes have to be recom-
puted. As a consequence, the cipher components for F-subtree leaf nodes must be updated
accordingly. Then at least 2 ∗ n
2
extra elements from group G are required. The extra
storage required is referred as Fuzzy IBE1 in Fig. 6.3.
As to Fuzzy IBE2, extra default nodes are added into F-subtree which results in extra
cipher components to be mounted in the cipher-text, i.e., 2e group elements from G. In
addition, extra space for n
2
file attributes is needed.
In fuzzy authorization, we insert checking nodes in the access trees and compute extra
cipher components. According to the property of MDS code, for error correction ability of
e, at least 2e checking nodes are required. The number of extra elements from group G is
4e. The storage consumption of these three solutions are demonstrated in Fig. 6.3.
From Fig. 6.3, we can observe that extra storage consumption of fuzzy authorization
is always less than that of Fuzzy IBE1. In addition, when e = 1, k < 10 and e = 2, k < 6,
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of Storage Consumption
fuzzy authorization has an advantage in storage consumption than Fuzzy IBE2 as well.
6.4.3 Revocation
Currently, most authorization schemes utilize manually revocation. As the backgrounds of
owners vary large and for a less-cared owner, he or she may easily forget the revocation.
We assume that once owner remembers, he or she will revoke. Therefore, based on Ebbing-
haus Forgetting Curve, the probability of revocation failure is demonstrated in Fig. 6.4.
Assume owner updates the original data at time tchange, then in FA, the non-revocation
probability before tchange is 100% and after tchange is 0%. As manifested in Fig. 6.4, the
uncertainty of human brain may result in higher probability of failure while revocation in
fuzzy authorization is more determinate.
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6.4.4 Time Cost for Protocol Procedures
Since the response delay of each parties varies, the time consumption of each protocol
procedure varies as well. By keeping the response delay of one party as a variant and
fixing the delay response of the other three parties, we show how one party’s response
delay affects the overall time consumption.
Time Consumption of Service Request Protocol
The service request protocol basically contains two steps. Owner send a request to ASP
asking for service and ASP responses with a redirect command that redirect owner to cloud
storage provider. So the overall procedure contains propagation delay from owner to ASP,
ASP to owner and owner to cloud storage provider and also the response delay between
owner and ASP.
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Figure 6.5: Time Consumption of Service Request Protocol
So there are two major factors affect the overall time. One is the response delay of
ASP and the other is response delay of owner. Through testing with WebSitePulse, we fix
the response time of owner as 40ms when set the response delay of ASP as a variant. In
Fig. 6.5, blue line shows that the overall time consumption starts at 40ms and is linearly
increased with gradient one as the response delay ascending. In Fig. 6.5, the black line
indicates the entire time consumption growth based on the increase of the response delay
of owner. The black line shows that, the entire time consumption grows with gradient one
and starts at 30ms.
Time Consumption of Token Issuing Protocol
Token issuing protocol is much more complex and involves four parties. So there are at
least four major factors that influence the overall time. Let us fix the response delay of AS
as 20ms and response delay of CSP as 50ms where these two factors are not variants. We
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Figure 6.6: Time Consumption of Token Issuing Protocol
shall take a look at the Fig. 6.6 and analyze how each response delay impacts the entire
time of the protocol.
The plain blue line shows how the response delay impacts the overall time consumption.
Blue line with asterisks demonstrates the way the response delay of application service
provider impacts the overall time. Blue line embedded with circles indicates response
delay of application store influences the overall time consumption. The way how response
time of owner affects the overall time is shown with the blue line embedded with triangles.
For simplicity of notation, let us denote the lines as lines 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
As demonstrated in Fig. 6.6, line 1 indicates overall time increases with gradient of four
starting from 260ms as the response time of CSP ascending. Line 2 shows that overall time
initiating from 460ms and grows with gradient of two. Line 3 demonstrates that overall
time ascends along with the increase of response delay of application store. Line 4 shows
that increases of the response delay of owner influences the overall time to ascend four
56
times. Also, it is obvious to notice that the response delay of owner and CSP cast larger
influence to the overall time consumption because the increase gradients are larger.
Time Consumption of File Access Protocol
The file access protocol is relatively simpler where ASP request for the archive file and
show the access token to CSP. CSP examines the expiration time and access scope of the
access token before sending file to ASP. So the overall time contains propagation and the
response delay from ASP to CSP and the transmission time of the archive file.
As a result, there are two major factors affect the overall time. They are the response
delay and propagation time of ASP and the response delay and propagation time of CSP. In
Fig. 6.7, the black line indicates the entire time consumption growth based on the increase
of the response delay of ASP. The black line shows that, the entire time consumption grows
with gradient one and starts at 30ms. The blue line of CSP, on the other hand, display
that entire time consumption grows with gradient one and starts at 30ms.
6.4.5 Algorithm Complexity Analysis
Assume the number of files that about to be authorized to ASP is k and the number of
error that can be tolerated is e. We denote N as the number of leaf nodes in F-subtree,
O(Exp) the computing time of exponentiation of group elements, and O(Mul) be the time
of multiplication of two group elements.
Ciphertext Computing
In Fuzzy IBE adapted in authorization 1, access trees with another threshold value of all
the files that are about to be authorized to ASP are created. Furthermore, the cipher-text
components matched with F-sub-tree are recomputed. Let the complexity of computing
the attributes of A-Fubtree and TimeSlot be O(Basic). So the complexity of Fuzzy IBE
adapted in authorization 1 is 2NK · O(Exp) + O(Basic). As to Fuzzy IBE adapted in
authorization 2, there are e extra nodes added in the F-sub-tree and then the complexity
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Figure 6.7: Time Consumption of File Access Protocol
of computing is 2e · O(Exp) + O(Basic). Similarly, Fuzzy Authorization’s computing
complexity is 4e · O(Exp) + O(Basic). The computing complexity of three schemes is
shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Ciphertext Computing
Schemes Complexity of ciphertext computing
Fuzzy IBE1 2NK ·O(Exp) +O(Basic)
Fuzzy IBE2 2e ·O(Exp) +O(Basic)
FA 4e ·O(Exp) +O(Basic)
58
Table 6.5: Secret Key Issuing Complexity
Schemes Complexity of secret key issuing
Fuzzy IBE1 O(Fundamental)
Fuzzy IBE2 2d ·O(Exp) + d ·O(Mul) +O(Fundamental)
FA 4d ·O(Exp) + 2d ·O(Mul) +O(Fundamental)
Secret Key Issuing Complexity
Let O(Fundamental) be the computing complexity of the original access tree. In Fuzzy
IBE1, there is no extra computing while in Fuzzy IBE2, extra 2d · O(Exp) + d · O(Mul)
computing is needed. Besides the fundamental computing, in FA, extra 4d ·O(Exp) + 2d ·
O(Mul) computing is needed. The computing complexity of three schemes is shown in
Table 6.5.
Decryption Complexity
The main procedure of decryption is to perform interpolation. In both Fuzzy IBE1 and
Fuzzy IBE2, decryption needs to call satisfying an access tree procedure to determine
which of the cipher-text components and secret key components are selected to perform
interpolation. The number of leaf nodes in F-subtree is N in Fuzzy IBE1 and N + e in
Fuzzy IBE2. Hence the complexity of satisfying an access tree of Fuzzy IBE1 is N string
comparisons and of Fuzzy IBE2 is N+e string comparisons. In fuzzy authorization, instead
of calling satisfying an access tree procedure, the error checking procedure is required which
has a cost of N(N −K) · O(Exp) + (N − 1)(N −K) · O(Mul). If there are errors exist,
correction procedure is then conducted. The complexity of error correction is [2(K −
1) + (NK)]O(Exp) + (
N
K)K · O(Mul). Let O(DecInter) denote the rest interpolations for
decryption. Then the complexities of decryption of three schemes are displayed in Table 6.6.
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Table 6.6: Decryption Complexity
Schemes Complexity of secret key issuing
Fuzzy IBE1 N string comparisons
Fuzzy IBE2 N + e string comparisons
FA [2(K − 1) + (NK)]O(Exp) + (NK)K ·O(Mul)
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we present the conclusion in Section 7.1 and in Section 7.2, we demonstrate
the future work.
7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we propose a new authorization scheme, fuzzy authorization, which carries
out a flexible file sharing between owner who stores her data in one cloud party and
applications who registered within another cloud party. In addition, in fuzzy authorization,
the confidentiality of data is maintained through symmetric encryption and attribute based
encryption; the integrity of data is checked with integrity tag by owner or ASP; and the
access control is securely implemented with modified CP-ABE.
By tampering one of the components of secret key to be incorrect, the simulation of
FA protocol suggests that our authorization scheme successfully corrects the unmatched
indirect secret share, recovers the top secret and performs the decryption for KE. FA’s
self-error-checking ability eliminates the requirement of sending the file attribute to ASP
and error-correcing ability omits necessity of performing satisfying the access tree proce-
dure are proved by our simulation at a minor tradeoff in efficiency. Further more, the
simulation indicates that with the update of TimeSlot attribute, our authorization scheme
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automatically invalidates the authorized reading right from ASP. Comparing to Fuzzy
IBE1 and Fuzzy IBE2, the simulation results show that our solution FA reduces the stor-
age consumption when e = 1 and number of authorization file is less than nine which is
the most often occurring situation. The average time consumption of protocol collected in
our simulation implies that FA scheme is feasible and acceptable.
7.2 Future Work
While this thesis addresses the reading right authorization on cloud storage, our future
work will aim to resolve the writing right accreditation. Since the writing authorization
accreditation other parties to change owner’s data, trust between owner and other parties
must be built on a more rigorous authentication.
Also, we adopt the lazy revocation for our scheme which requires the owner to choose
random increase value st and compute e(g, g)
αst at time t when he updates the archive file.
The cryptographic data structure is updated so as to revoke. Compare to revocation at the
beginning of equivalent time slot, lazy revocation keeps owner from extra re-encryption.
Unfortunately, lazy revocation slightly lowers the security [23]. In the future work, we will
work on another revocation scheme that eliminates the updating of cryptographic data
structure and enhance the security.
Besides, for we are using the original GRS decoding method, the complexity of er-
ror correction grows exponentially when the number of file attributes increases. A more
efficient way to detect and correct the errors should be considered and tested in later work.
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